Surviving Authoritarianism: Institutional Structure, the Resource Curse, and the Outlier Case of Assad’s Syria
In Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, governance was centered almost entirely on the persona and ambitions of the ruler. Both regimes exhibited high levels of centralized control and an authoritarian grip dependent on personal loyalty and militaristic patronage rather than stable, institutional governance. Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist Iraq and Gaddafi’s Libya lacked robust, independent institutions that could check the ruler’s ambitions or provide continuity beyond their personal authority. This absence of institutional support limited these leaders’ ability to manage crises, ensure stable succession, or adapt to shifting geopolitical pressures.
Saddam’s and Gaddafi’s rule relied heavily on tribal loyalty and military strength. While this centralized control initially provided cohesion, it also created systemic fragility. The absence of institutional structures meant that decisions were dictated primarily by the leader’s immediate needs or ambitions, leading to reactive rather than strategic governance. For instance, Saddam’s decision to invade Kuwait in 1990 was a high-stakes maneuver rooted in his assessment of Iraq’s economic and regional standing, but it neglected broader geopolitical implications. This overconfidence, rooted in his militaristic background, revealed Iraq’s vulnerability to miscalculation and led to catastrophic consequences when the U.S.-led coalition retaliated, leading to long-term economic sanctions and eventual regime collapse.
Without a structured political party or institutional system to ensure long-term planning or succession, both Iraq and Libya faced severe risks when their leaders’ power faltered. Their reliance on personal loyalty over competence created a governance structure where dissent was impossible, policy alternatives went unconsidered, and any breakdown in the leader’s control could lead to immediate destabilization. Gaddafi’s downfall during the Arab Spring exemplifies this dynamic: lacking robust institutional allies or a clear line of succession, Libya quickly fell into chaos after his death, leading to prolonged civil conflict.
1. Party-Led vs. Solo-Dictator Regimes: Stability Through Institutionalization
Authoritarian regimes centered around a single party structure, as seen in China, North Korea, and Iran, benefit from a controlled form of institutionalization that aids in stability and resilience. These regimes, while dictatorial, allow for limited forms of internal debate and controlled dissent, ensuring that decision-making isn’t solely reliant on one leader’s personal judgment. This institutionalization enables adaptability to change and crisis absorption through structured mechanisms, positioning these regimes more favorably for longevity.
Institutional Adaptability and Calculated Risk-Taking:
In party-led authoritarian states, power is distributed through established structures and ideological unity, which balance loyalty with collective input. For example, China’s Communist Party and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard allow strategic policymaking within the limits of ideology, creating a feedback loop that can prevent or mitigate risky decisions. This structured hierarchy encourages resilience by creating checks that discourage impulsive moves and instead allow measured responses to external or internal pressures.
Solo-Dictator Vulnerability to Personal Ambitions and Overreach:
By contrast, regimes like those of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Gaddafi in Libya, and Hitler in Nazi Germany lacked institutional resilience. These leaders concentrated power in their own hands, sidelining institutional feedback, which stifled strategic debate and exposed the regime to risks of abrupt collapse. Without an institutional framework to provide continuity, these regimes were often destabilized by the ruler’s personal ambitions and ideological fixations, with no internal mechanisms to moderate or correct miscalculations.
2. The Outlier Case of Assad’s Syria: Survival Through Sectarian Loyalty and Strategic Alliances
Bashar al-Assad’s survival as Syria’s authoritarian leader poses an outlier case in the context of solo-dictator regimes. Assad’s ability to maintain power, despite significant internal and external pressures, can be attributed to several factors unique to Syria’s geopolitical context, Assad’s strategic alliances, and his skillful management of sectarian loyalty.
Sectarian Loyalty and Structural Adaptability:
Assad’s regime, while ultimately authoritarian, is supported by Syria’s Alawite minority, who view Assad’s rule as crucial to their survival amid a predominantly Sunni population. This sectarian loyalty has provided Assad with a strong base of support within the military and security forces, whose Alawite officers are personally invested in preserving the regime. This loyalty allowed Assad to retain control over Syria’s coercive apparatus, especially during the civil war, ensuring a united front against both internal rebellion and external intervention.
Strategic Alliances with Iran and Russia:
Assad’s foreign alliances have been instrumental to his survival. Russia and Iran view Syria as a strategic ally, essential for maintaining regional influence. Iran has provided financial and military support through Hezbollah and the IRGC, creating an invaluable foreign-backed network to defend Assad. Meanwhile, Russia’s military intervention in 2015 tipped the scales, ensuring Assad’s survival by deploying troops and air power that prevented the opposition from seizing control. These alliances offered Syria critical military and logistical support and provided a diplomatic buffer against Western intervention, allowing Assad to outlast other autocratic leaders who faced less coordinated support.
Control of Urban Centers and Strategic Territory:
Unlike Gaddafi, whose power quickly dissipated across Libya’s tribal lines, Assad maintained control over key Syrian cities and infrastructure, especially Damascus, Homs, and the coastal regions. By concentrating forces and securing economically and politically strategic areas, Assad retained the appearance of governing a functioning state. This geographic control gave the regime legitimacy and stability, allowing it to project strength even as Syria fractured into contested territories.
3. The Resource Curse and Its Destabilizing Impact on Autocratic Regimes
The “resource curse” theory posits that countries with abundant natural resources, especially oil and gas, are more likely to experience economic and political instability. Rather than driving growth, resource wealth often enables corruption, fuels patronage networks, and exacerbates authoritarianism by centralizing wealth around the ruler or ruling elites. In Iraq and Libya, the resource curse created unsustainable economic and political dynamics, undermining long-term stability.
Economic Fragility Due to Over-Reliance on Resource Revenues:
Oil-rich nations like Iraq and Libya concentrated wealth in the hands of ruling elites, with little focus on economic diversification. The sudden influx of resource wealth allowed leaders to consolidate power through patronage, often stifling other sectors and creating a fragile, oil-dependent economy. This over-reliance on resource revenues left these regimes vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices and made it difficult to sustain public welfare and security spending during economic downturns, destabilizing the regime.
Encouragement of Authoritarianism and Weak Institutions:
The wealth generated by oil enabled leaders like Saddam and Gaddafi to maintain power without needing to rely on public support or institutional structures. With little incentive to develop robust institutions or governance mechanisms, both leaders created highly centralized regimes dependent on resource revenues. This fragile setup backfired during periods of instability, as the lack of institutional resilience meant the regimes could not effectively respond to crises, leading to abrupt and violent collapses.
Distorted Foreign Policy and Overconfidence:
Resource wealth contributed to overconfidence in foreign policy decisions, as leaders believed their financial power provided insulation from international consequences. Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and Gaddafi’s international insurgency sponsorship are examples of resource-fueled overreach. These risky foreign policies ultimately provoked backlash and intervention, with the regimes lacking the institutional checks to assess or restrain the leader’s ambitions.
4. Comparison with Institutionalized Resource Management in Iran and Communist States
Despite also being an energy powerhouse, Iran has managed to mitigate some aspects of the resource curse due to its hybrid institutional structure. Iran’s government combines religious and state institutions, creating a balance between economic interests and political stability that oil-dependent dictatorships lack. Additionally, communist regimes like China and Vietnam, though often resource-rich, rely on centralized party structures that prioritize long-term economic planning over short-term wealth distribution, reducing the destabilizing effects of resource wealth.
Iran’s Hybrid Institutions and Controlled Resource Allocation:
Iran’s political structure, while authoritarian, integrates various factions, such as the Supreme Leader’s office, the IRGC, and the government bureaucracy, creating a complex system of checks that manage resource allocation and reduce over-dependence on oil. Iran’s partial use of oil revenues for public welfare, military investments, and economic diversification (to the extent possible under sanctions) has insulated it from the severe impacts of the resource curse seen in Iraq or Libya. This structured approach allows Iran to engage in calculated risk-taking rather than impulsive, resource-fueled overreach.
Centralized Resource Planning in Communist Regimes:
Communist states, such as China and Vietnam, approach resource management with a centralized economic plan, emphasizing stability and gradual development. Resource wealth is typically used to bolster state infrastructure and support the party’s long-term vision rather than for short-term personal gain. China’s investment in diversified industries and infrastructure exemplifies this approach, demonstrating that centralized planning can mitigate the “boom and bust” cycle seen in resource-dependent dictatorships.
5. The Downfall of Nazi Germany and the Pitfalls of Centralized, Cult-Driven Authoritarianism
The Nazi regime, while sophisticated in terms of administrative capability, lacked the institutional checks necessary to balance Hitler’s ideological ambitions. Hitler’s concentration of power and personal authority led to strategic overreach, most notably with the invasion of the Soviet Union, a campaign that ultimately stretched German resources and hastened the regime’s collapse. Nazi Germany’s fate underscores the vulnerability of regimes where one individual’s personal agenda supersedes institutional debate and rational policymaking.
Personal Ambition Over Strategic Input:
While initially successful, Hitler’s increasingly centralized control and suppression of military and political dissent removed any institutional capacity to moderate his ambitions. With Hitler’s cult of personality at the regime’s core, dissent was stifled, leading to increasingly irrational decisions that ignored the advice of experienced generals. The resulting overreach culminated in Operation Barbarossa, which ultimately turned the tide against Germany.
Emergence of Natural Counter-Forces:
The stifling of internal feedback in Nazi Germany contributed to the emergence of natural counter-forces, such as Operation Valkyrie. German officers and officials, recognizing that Hitler’s leadership threatened the country’s survival, attempted to orchestrate his assassination and restore more rational governance. This internal resistance reflected the pressures within a regime where dissent was heavily suppressed, but where unsustainable decisions bred a desperate need for regime change.
6: Carl Schmitt and the Evolution of Modern Dictatorship Compared to Ancient Tyranny
Carl Schmitt’s exploration of dictatorship sheds light on why modern authoritarian regimes differ fundamentally from ancient tyrannies in terms of structure, purpose, and resilience. In works such as Dictatorship and Political Theology, Schmitt examined the unique features of modern dictatorship, contrasting them with the arbitrary, personalistic nature of ancient tyranny. He argued that modern authoritarian states, unlike ancient tyrannies, establish institutionalized structures and ideological frameworks that provide stability, legitimacy, and adaptability. This section explores Schmitt’s perspective on these differences, illustrating how modern dictatorships leverage institutional authority, ideological cohesion, and emergency powers to achieve state resilience in ways that ancient tyrannies could not.
6.1 The Demarcation Line: Renaissance Realism to Enlightenment Ideals
The shift from ancient tyranny to modern dictatorship began in the Renaissance and was solidified during the Enlightenment, which introduced fundamental changes to how power and authority were conceptualized.
The Renaissance period reintroduced classical ideas on governance and sovereignty while infusing them with a pragmatic approach to leadership. This shift is notably exemplified in the figure of Lorenzo de’ Medici (il Magnifico), who Niccolò Machiavelli regarded as a transitional figure. Lorenzo wielded power not simply through personal dominance but by skillfully navigating the complex political dynamics of Renaissance Italy, establishing an early form of purpose-driven autocracy. For Machiavelli, Lorenzo represented a new kind of ruler who combined charisma with strategic alliances and institutional influence, setting the stage for a form of authoritarianism that was about statecraft as much as personal power.
However, it was during the Enlightenment that concepts such as the rule of law, social contracts, and collective identity truly took shape, transforming the nature of authoritarian governance. Thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Montesquieu established that authority could — and perhaps should — be constrained by laws, institutions, and a framework of responsibility to the state and society. By promoting these principles, Enlightenment philosophy laid the groundwork for a governance model where authority was justified not through personal power alone, but through institutional purpose and legal norms.
6.2 Purpose-Driven Governance vs. Personal Rule
Modern Dictatorship as Instrumental and Purpose-Driven
Schmitt identified a key distinction between modern dictatorship and ancient tyranny: modern dictatorships are designed to serve a purpose beyond the personal authority of the ruler. In Schmitt’s view, modern dictatorships operate within a legal or quasi-legal framework that allows leaders to take extraordinary measures to protect or transform the state. This purpose-driven governance often includes implementing ideological or national objectives, which provides a clear direction for the regime. By contrast, ancient tyrannies were primarily concerned with maintaining the personal power of the ruler, without a structured or collective purpose beyond individual authority.
Institutionalized Justification of Authority
In modern dictatorships, authority is often legitimized through state-defined ideological or national missions, whereas ancient tyrants derived their authority from personal power alone. Schmitt saw this as a fundamental shift in the nature of authoritarian rule, where institutionalized or ideological frameworks justify the use of power, making it more sustainable. This evolution from personal rule to rule for the state or ideology allows modern dictatorships to withstand leadership transitions or crises without collapsing.
6.3 The State of Exception as a Distinct Feature
Sovereign Exception in Modern Dictatorship
Schmitt famously argued that the power to declare a “state of exception” is central to sovereignty. In modern dictatorships, this concept of a legal or constitutional “state of exception” allows regimes to suspend laws temporarily in times of crisis. This practice differentiates modern dictatorship from ancient tyranny, which often disregarded the law entirely, operating on the ruler’s arbitrary decisions. Modern dictatorships, however, justify extraordinary powers as temporary measures for the state’s survival, reinforcing their legitimacy and making their authority more structured and adaptable.
Emergency Powers and Constitutional Dictatorship
Schmitt drew a further distinction between two types of modern dictatorship: commissarial and sovereign. A commissarial dictatorship is a temporary constitutional form of rule, focused on restoring order and then relinquishing extraordinary power. This approach reflects a legalistic structure intended to preserve the state. Ancient tyranny, by contrast, typically ignored any limitations on authority, which often resulted in instability and undermined the regime’s legitimacy. This concept of a “constitutional” or purpose-driven dictatorship is a uniquely modern development that reinforces the regime’s alignment with state interests rather than personal gain.
6.4 Institutional Structure and the Role of Ideology
Ideological Foundations in Modern Dictatorships
Modern dictatorships often establish an ideological foundation that unifies the state and society, aligning governance with a set of shared principles or goals. Schmitt observed that ideology in modern authoritarian regimes serves as a cohesive force, binding state officials, military leaders, and citizens under a common narrative. This ideological structure strengthens the state’s resilience, as loyalty is directed toward the state’s mission rather than the individual ruler. Ancient tyrannies lacked this ideological foundation, relying instead on direct personal loyalty, which left them vulnerable to succession crises and internal dissent.
Structured Bureaucracy and Party Organizations
Schmitt noted that modern dictatorships employ complex bureaucracies, party structures, and military organizations to manage and enforce authority. These structures create systematic control over the state, ensuring that loyalty and governance extend beyond the central ruler. Ancient tyrannies, lacking this structured hierarchy, were typically built on more fragile networks of personal loyalty and alliances, which often crumbled when the ruler’s authority was challenged. The organized structure of modern dictatorships allows for a higher level of operational complexity and resilience.
6.5 Contrast with Ancient Tyranny’s Arbitrary Rule
Rule Without Law in Ancient Tyranny
Ancient tyrannies often ruled without formal laws or consistent principles, relying on the ruler’s will rather than a stable legal framework. Schmitt highlighted this as a critical weakness of ancient tyranny, as it prevented long-term stability and legitimacy. By contrast, modern dictatorships generally retain or suspend laws within a rule-based framework, preserving the appearance of legitimacy even when acting outside normal legal constraints. This approach helps maintain order and reinforces the regime’s authority, as actions are justified within a structured legal narrative.
Reliance on Fear and Coercion
While modern dictatorships still use fear and coercion, they supplement these tools with ideological narratives and institutional support. Ancient tyrannies often relied exclusively on personal fear and control, which made them susceptible to rebellions and coups. Modern authoritarian regimes, however, establish ideological loyalty and use institutionalized surveillance and control mechanisms to maintain order. This blend of fear, ideology, and institutional control creates a more sustainable base for governance.
6.6 Legitimacy Through Rule-Based Governance and Social Integration
Institutional Legitimacy vs. Personal Legitimacy
Schmitt argued that modern dictatorships achieve legitimacy through their alignment with state interests or ideological goals, whereas ancient tyrants relied solely on personal authority. This shift enables modern authoritarian states to establish institutions that outlast the individual ruler, reducing the likelihood of regime collapse upon the leader’s death. Institutional legitimacy, grounded in rule-based governance and collective ideology, creates a stability that ancient tyrannies, built around personal legitimacy, rarely achieved.
Integration of Society Through Ideological and Institutional Means
Modern dictatorships often integrate society into the state by building ideological and institutional bonds, such as party membership, public service, or military involvement. This social integration creates a cohesive system where citizens and officials alike are invested in the regime’s stability. Schmitt noted that this integration reflects a secular “political theology,” where ideological principles act as a unifying force, much like religious doctrine. Ancient tyrannies, lacking this form of ideological or institutional integration, struggled to maintain consistent loyalty beyond their immediate networks.
6.7 Schmitt’s Perspective on the Resilience of Modern Dictatorship
Schmitt’s analysis underscores that modern dictatorship is fundamentally distinct from ancient tyranny due to its structured, purpose-driven, and legally justified framework. The Renaissance period planted the seeds of this transition, as Machiavelli’s view of Lorenzo de’ Medici reflected a new realism in political governance — one that valued statecraft, strategy, and controlled authority over pure personal power. The Enlightenment, however, provided the philosophical and structural foundation for rule-based governance, institutional legitimacy, and ideological cohesion.
In modern dictatorships, Schmitt recognized the power of legal frameworks, ideology, and institutionalized authority to create a resilient form of authoritarianism. By grounding authority in structured institutions and ideological narratives, modern authoritarian regimes can maintain stability, manage crises, and outlast individual rulers, marking a significant departure from the volatility of ancient tyranny.
Conclusion: Variables Constituting Resilience in Institutionalized Authoritarian Regimes
Our analysis highlights the critical factors that contribute to the resilience and longevity of institutionalized authoritarian regimes, distinguishing them from fragile, solo-dictator models. The presence of structured institutions, power distribution, and controlled internal feedback mechanisms provides authoritarian states with tools to manage risk, adapt policies, and maintain stability. The key variables that constitute resilience in these regimes are as follows:
- Power Distribution and Structured Hierarchies:
Authoritarian regimes with institutionalized power structures, such as communist party-led states, create multiple centers of authority within the government. Bodies like politburos, councils, or strategic military arms (e.g., the IRGC in Iran) function as intermediary power sources that support and enforce the leader’s policies but also moderate potential overreach. This distributed power mitigates risks associated with personal authority, ensuring continuity even if the leader’s position is destabilized. - Controlled Feedback Mechanisms:
Effective institutionalized regimes allow for structured internal debate within controlled boundaries. Feedback mechanisms, such as advisory boards, central committees, or policy review councils, enable measured dissent and critique without threatening the regime. This controlled feedback loop ensures that strategic missteps are addressed and provides a way to adjust policies in response to new challenges, reducing the likelihood of unchecked errors. - Ideological Cohesion and Collective Identity:
Cohesive ideological foundations, often reinforced by a unifying party doctrine or revolutionary identity, foster loyalty to the regime beyond personal allegiance to the leader. This ideological cohesion creates a shared purpose among elites, citizens, and institutions, uniting them under a vision that outlasts individual rulers. In Iran, for instance, the Islamic Revolution’s principles bind diverse factions under a common goal, ensuring that power transitions and internal conflicts do not lead to regime collapse. - Loyalty Driven by Institution Rather than Personal Cult:
In regimes like North Korea or China, loyalty is often to the party or ideology rather than a single leader, allowing for stable succession planning and loyalty even in times of leadership transition. This institutionalized loyalty contrasts with personal-cult models, where allegiance is tied to the individual ruler, as seen in Saddam’s Iraq or Gaddafi’s Libya, making these regimes susceptible to collapse when the leader’s authority is challenged. - Economic and Resource Management:
A sustainable approach to resource management, avoiding over-reliance on volatile revenue sources like oil, allows regimes to stabilize the economy and avoid the pitfalls of the resource curse. Party-led systems, such as those in China, prioritize diversification and long-term planning over immediate gains, insulating them from economic shocks and ensuring a steady base for maintaining state functions. - Adaptability and Strategic Flexibility:
The structure of institutionalized authoritarian regimes supports long-term strategic planning and policy adaptation. Whether through controlled economic reform (China) or factional influence (Iran), these regimes allow gradual adjustments to political, economic, and international conditions. This adaptability ensures that they can respond to crises without resorting to destabilizing or extreme actions, preserving regime continuity.
These variables — distributed power, controlled feedback, ideological cohesion, institutional loyalty, economic prudence, and adaptability — constitute the foundation of resilience in institutionalized authoritarian regimes. By contrast, solo-dictator models that rely on personal power, lack of institutional depth, and absence of strategic feedback loops are more prone to abrupt collapse, as they cannot absorb or mitigate the pressures of succession, economic challenges, or external threats. This framework underscores the complex dynamics within authoritarian governance and provides insight into why some regimes endure while others fall.
