Prismatic Power: Understanding Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s Unexpected Strength in Thai Politics
Thailand’s political system is frequently misunderstood by those who seek order and predictability in the structures of governance. Far from conforming to textbook models of democratic consolidation or Westminster-style parliamentary rule, Thai politics are characterized by fluid alliances, enduring negotiation, and the perpetual balancing of rival factions. In this landscape, the strength of leaders is not measured by the ability to dominate institutions, but by the capacity to navigate a fragmented, adaptive environment, a reality captured in Fred W. Riggs’ seminal concept of the “prismatic society.” This essay explores how such a context has unexpectedly favored leaders like Paetongtarn Shinawatra, whose apparent weaknesses, lack of experience, reliance on networks, and coalition-based leadership, have become assets in a system where consensus is fleeting and adaptability is key. By moving beyond surface-level comparisons and engaging with the deeper patterns of Thai political life, this analysis reveals why Paetongtarn’s style of power may be uniquely resilient, and why conventional approaches to political strength can fail to capture the true dynamics at work in contemporary Thailand.
The Prismatic Order: Thailand through Riggs’ Lens
Building on Fred W. Riggs’ concept of the “prismatic society,” Thailand can be best understood as a political and administrative system where modernity, patronage, and tradition intermingle without ever fully synthesizing into a post-conflict consensus. This prismatic structure produces persistent negotiation among factions, cronyism, and a fragmented, adaptive style of governance. Rather than evolving linearly toward institutional consolidation or consensus, the Thai system remains characterized by polycentric bargaining and semi-institutionalized, network-based authority. In this context, leaders like Paetongtarn Shinawatra derive their strength not from personal dominance or institutional centralization, but from their capacity to coordinate, mediate, and survive within a prismatic order where consensus is always temporary and always contested.
While Duncan McCargo’s concept of “network monarchy” has become a central reference point for the study of Thai politics, particularly in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, it has notable limitations when applied as a general model for understanding the enduring dynamics of power in Thailand.
- Over-Specification and Historical Narrowness: McCargo’s framework, developed largely to explain the politics of the Prem Tinsulanonda era and the ascendance of the Privy Council, tends to anchor Thai political analysis to a specific constellation of actors, notably, the monarchy, military, and top bureaucratic officials operating as a coherent, centralized network. This reading accurately captures periods of highly coordinated elite intervention, but it risks overstating the coherence and permanence of these networks across different eras. Historical evidence shows that Thailand’s politics have rarely been so stable or unified. Instead, power has been recurrently contested among a much broader and shifting array of actors: regional barons, business conglomerates, populist politicians, and shifting military cliques, as well as the palace.
- Underestimation of Polycentric and Factional Dynamics: By emphasizing the monarchy’s integrative and arbitrating role, “network monarchy” can obscure the multi-factional, competitive nature of Thai politics. It tends to underplay the fragmentation, rivalry, and temporary alliances that define the Thai political arena — features that Riggs’ prismatic society model brings into sharp relief. Even during the apex of the so-called network monarchy, major policy and personnel decisions often emerged from lengthy negotiations and strategic bargains among multiple rival groups, rather than from the top-down dictates of a unified network. The assumption of a “core” network minimizes the agency of competing elites and downplays the resilience of local and informal power structures.
- Weakness in Capturing Enduring Cronyism and Non-Institutionalization: McCargo’s thesis also tends to frame Thailand’s politics as more institutionalized than is warranted, focusing on a “network” that, while informal, is often described in the literature as being tightly organized and hierarchically managed. In reality, as Fred W. Riggs and subsequent scholars have shown, cronyism, patron-client ties, and pragmatic, shifting alliances prevail over any lasting institutional order. This fluidity makes Thai governance less a matter of stable “networks” and more a matter of perpetually shifting constellations of interests.
- Insufficient Attention to Chronic Negotiation and Unfinished Transition: Finally, the “network monarchy” model is ill-suited for capturing Thailand’s chronic state of political negotiation and unfinished transition. The rise and fall of various political figures, movements, and parties, from Thaksin Shinawatra to the current coalition arrangements, demonstrate that power is never fully captured nor neutralized by any one network or institution.
The enduring characteristic of Thai politics, as suggested by Riggs, is not the stability of a network but the resilience of a fragmented, prismatic order in which authority is always negotiated, never fully consolidated.
Comparing Singapore and Thailand: Contrasting Systems of Governance
Singapore’s political system is characterized by robust institutionalization, clear chains of command, and a technocratic ethos. The ruling party (People’s Action Party, PAP) has, for decades, ensured tight party discipline, centralized policy formulation, and a seamless leadership transition process. Decision-making is typically top-down, policy-driven, and highly coordinated. The Prime Minister in Singapore is both the true center of power and the clear public face of government, with broad and deep bureaucratic support. This system has fostered predictable governance, policy continuity, and high international credibility.
By contrast, Thailand operates within a fragmented, polycentric, and personalized environment. As previously discussed (drawing on Riggs), governance is prismatic: characterized by a blend of modern bureaucracy, patron-client networks, and informal factionalism. The Prime Minister’s authority depends not only on legal or electoral mandates, but also on the ability to negotiate among multiple, shifting coalitions and rival power centers (military, monarchy, business, regional elites, and various party factions). Policy implementation is often inconsistent, vulnerable to abrupt shifts in alliance, and reliant on personal influence rather than institutional procedure.
While Singapore and Thailand have each developed distinct systems of governance, both trace their formal political structures to the British Westminster parliamentary model. However, Thailand’s unique character , as a “pre-consensus” or, in Fred Riggs’ terms, a prismatic society rather than a “post-conflict” society, means it cannot tolerate the kind of clear, absolutist power consolidation seen during Thaksin’s era. Despite its Westminster-inspired design, real political practice in Thailand often veers toward a semi-presidential mode: when power is consolidated, as under Thaksin, it can become far stronger than what the British legacy would normally allow, bypassing both cabinet consultation and constant parliamentary debate. The strong presence of patronage and nepotism amplifies this divergence, fostering personalized, rather than institutional, rule.
Consequently, although Thailand’s governmental structure closely resembles that of the UK, with a Prime Minister, Cabinet, and Parliament, the actual dynamics of power are far less institutionalized and more fragmented. In the UK, party discipline, cabinet collective responsibility, and robust parliamentary scrutiny ensure that authority is exercised through transparent, formal channels and is subject to clear checks and balances. In contrast, Thai governance is defined by personal networks, shifting coalitions, and ongoing negotiation among rival elites. Cabinet appointments are often the product of factional bargaining rather than policy alignment, and key decisions are frequently shaped outside formal institutions, through patron-client ties and informal consultations.
Within this prismatic order, a Thai Prime Minister’s authority depends less on commanding a unified party or cabinet, and more on the ability to manage and reconcile a wide array of competing interests. Any attempt to centralize power too forcefully, as in the Thaksin era , tends to provoke resistance from other entrenched groups, sometimes resulting in instability or intervention from extra-parliamentary actors such as the military or judiciary. While the UK’s Westminster model aspires to stable, rule-based governance, Thailand’s political system is inherently polycentric and adaptive, reflecting a society that has never achieved a lasting consensus on the rules of the game. Ongoing negotiation, rather than orderly debate or formal institutional constraint, remains the true hallmark of Thai political practice.
The Real Power of Paetongtarn Shinawatra
This deeper understanding of Thailand’s prismatic, negotiation-driven political order helps explain why Paetongtarn Shinawatra is, in fact, a much stronger figure than many outside analysts assume. The mainstream narrative often frames her simply as a dynastic heir, drawing surface comparisons to Singapore’s Lee Hsien Loong (LSL) as the direct successor of Lee Kuan Yew (LKY), with Goh Chok Tong (GCT) as an intermediate bridge. Yet, the Thai context is fundamentally different: while Paetongtarn’s familial link to Thaksin provides her with undeniable political capital, it is not the source of her strength in the current landscape. If anything, direct succession in the “strong leader” mold has historically triggered fierce backlash in Thailand’s prismatic society, as witnessed during Thaksin’s own tenure.
What sets Paetongtarn apart, and what makes her resilient in ways that surprise traditional observers, is precisely her unusual blend of strengths and weaknesses. On one hand, she possesses a unique, direct line to Thaksin and his networks, offering unparalleled access to party machinery, patronage, and loyalist support. On the other hand, her relative inexperience in statecraft, and her lack of a dominating administrative style, are often perceived as liabilities. Yet in the fragmented, coalition-bound environment preferred by the Thai elite, these are precisely the qualities that render her less threatening and more durable. Her leadership style, shaped by negotiation and mediation rather than command, fits seamlessly into a system where visible overreach is punished, and where the equilibrium is maintained through perpetual balancing of interests.
Thus, Paetongtarn’s apparent “weakness,” her reliance on alliances, her openness to elite negotiation, and her softer approach to power, actually serves as her greatest strategic asset. Rather than seeking to dominate or centralize, she survives and even thrives by navigating the ever-shifting networks of influence that define Thailand’s prismatic society. Her tenure is not an imitation of Singapore’s carefully planned dynastic succession, but an adaptation to a political landscape where the very absence of consolidation, and the ability to mediate among rivals, is what ensures longevity and effectiveness in Thai governance. This nuanced dynamic is what mainstream, institution-focused analysts often overlook, but is crucial for understanding real power in contemporary Thailand.
Implications for Foreign Engagement
To conclude this analysis from a practical standpoint: if one were serving as an advisor to a foreign government engaging with Thailand, especially in policy-sensitive or strategic domains, it is essential to recalibrate expectations away from standard assumptions drawn from Westminster or presidential systems. In Thailand’s prismatic, pre-consensus environment, policy effectiveness does not stem solely from formal institutional agreement, but from alignment across multiple, semi-visible power centers.
Therefore, the most effective approach would be layered and network-aware engagement. Begin with formal protocol: engage the Prime Minister’s Office and relevant ministers through diplomatic and governmental channels. Paetongtarn Shinawatra, as Prime Minister, represents the executive face of the state and remains essential for legitimacy and coordination. However, recognize that policy traction and durability often depend on relationships beyond the Cabinet table.
It is advisable to identify and connect with key strategic advisors, such as those within the Baan Phitsanulok circle, and, where appropriate, seek discreet channels of alignment or understanding with legacy power figures like Thaksin Shinawatra. While such figures may not hold official titles, their influence, particularly in shaping or safeguarding long-term commitments, is considerable. Additionally, understanding the balance within the coalition government and its internal factions will offer clues to the staying power of any proposed policy.
In short, a successful strategy for engaging Thailand’s political system must combine formal diplomacy with informal awareness, recognizing that in a prismatic, non-post-conflict society, mastery of complexity is more valuable than a search for clarity. While engaging the Prime Minister, key advisors, and even influential networks behind the scenes is essential, none of these steps can truly guarantee a stable or predictable policy outcome. The very nature of Thailand’s system, shaped by its historical avoidance of lasting consensus and its chronic negotiation among competing elites, means that even the most carefully cultivated relationships and agreements remain vulnerable to sudden shifts in alliances, policy reversals, or extra-parliamentary interventions.
Thus, reliable policy implementation is never assured by formal announcements or signed MOUs alone. For foreign actors, the real skill lies not just in “speaking to the megaphone,” but in continuously mapping and engaging the complex, ever-changing networks that shape the message behind it. This fundamental unpredictability traces back to the heart of our analysis: Thailand’s enduring status as a non-post-conflict society, where the absence of settled consensus ensures that the rules, and the rulers, are always subject to renegotiation.
