Global Political Shifts: Analyzing the Rise of the Right and the Future of Governance

Kan Yuenyong
7 min readJul 8, 2024

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We are witnessing a pivotal transformation in global politics, evident in the recent UK election results, Europe’s rightward shift, and the upcoming US election. This phenomenon can be analyzed through the lens of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) and historical governance frameworks, drawing on Fukuyama’s concepts of a Strong State, Democratic Accountability, and the Rule of Law. By examining historical contexts, from the Qin empire’s bureaucratic developments to Nordic tribal assemblies, we uncover recurring themes in political power dynamics. The rise of far-right movements in Europe raises critical questions about the stability of democratic systems, echoing concerns from the post-Weimar era. This analysis underscores the delicate balance required to maintain ethical governance and prevent corruption, inviting a deeper reflection on the future of governance in an increasingly complex world.

Positive Governance Topology

I think we have now reached another breakthrough.

How can we explain the current phenomenon of both the UK election results, Europe’s swing to the right, and perhaps the upcoming US election at the end of this year?

We can consider all systems with self-correction mechanisms as Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), including governance. I have modeled this after Fukuyama, based on his first inquiry into governance in his book “State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century,” where he questions why state-building in Japan and (West) Germany post-War was successful, but not in Iraq or Afghanistan. In his exploration of political order, he devises a combination of three elements: Strong State (SS), Democratic Accountability (DA), and Rule of Law (RL).

We can trace SS back to the origins of bureaucratic development in the Qin empire, which served more as an enhancement of the ruler’s power rather than a check-and-balance mechanism. The unification of Qin Shi Huang and the Legalist school successfully crafted this concept throughout China’s history. However, this system wasn’t perfect, as it bred eunuchs entrusted by the emperor to handle complicated administrative tasks, often conflicting with provincial warlords. This was notable during the late Han era (staging the Yellow Turban Rebellion) and the power contest between the chamberlain Zhuge Liang during the Shu Han era. The Turkish empire resolved this issue by institutionalizing the Janissary elite unit to secure the Sultan’s power, while the Ayutthaya empire relied on foreign mercenaries (Portuguese or Japanese) as an ad hoc basis. The Edo Shogunate in Japan operated with decentralized Daimyo and political hostages in Edo (Sankin-kotai), working until the Meiji restoration.

The Rule of Law has roots in Greek philosophers like Socrates and Plato, emphasizing the importance of law (hence Plato’s “The Laws”). Democratic Accountability (DA) is more complex. DA has long roots in Nordic and Scandinavian tribal assemblies, known as “the thing” (or Þing) which were natural warrior nobility bands in a decentralized manner. These tribes later interacted with the church, inheriting both Christian and Greco-Roman governance wisdom, forming a legislative check-and-balance against rulers. This is true even in Britain, with the Briton Celts and old Saxon who contributed to the Magna Carta.

The conversion of Clovis I (c. 466–511) to Christianity was a significant transformative event in European history. This moment not only shaped the future of the Frankish kingdom but also facilitated the transfer of Roman knowledge, culture, and administrative practices to the emerging medieval European world through the Catholic Church.

In China, some brave nobles opposed the emperor, but it was rare and not as institutionalized as in Europe.

The shift in UK politics from Conservative to Labour after 14 years of Conservative rule indicates a periodic adjustment of power in a CAS, with a swing from right to left, implying more state power expansion after a period of privatization and market rules. (The US politics has more frequently shifting of policy than its counterpart.) Europe seems to follow this trend more radically, with elites trying to “prolonging” the shift by alienating the far right (like in the Netherlands). I think this will also happen in France and Germany. The emergence of the far right in Europe suggests a systemic issue in western politics. We must observe whether this will destabilize the self-correction mechanism beyond the threshold, as seen in post-Weimar Germany, leading to the Nazi era. However, contemporary geopolitics seem to prevent this from happening.

In a CAS, whenever we observe periodic oscillations, similar to a rope moving up and down when shaken or water in a pond rippling when a stone is thrown in, it implies some force is moving through the system. This oscillation, akin to the shifting left and right, typically self-corrects, but in some cases, it may become unbalanced and transform into a new system based on the observer’s values (either good or bad, like the Nazi era).

Regarding geopolitical constraints, these are also a kind of CAS in their own right. However, due to their larger conceptual scale and longer adjustment periods, we treat them as superstructure deterministic properties. This is different from CAS-governance, which mixes both deterministic and stochastic or probabilistic elements, thus operating on the edge of chaos. For example, the smaller CAS atmospheric system on Earth prevails, while on Mars it does not. This is because the geodynamos of both planets work differently. Mars has little mechanism compared to Earth to produce a magnetic shield to resist solar waves, resulting in the loss of its atmosphere. Likewise, CAS-governance operates within the bounds of the geopolitical framework, which is comparatively deterministic.

See our initial model here at this link: https://governance-visual.vercel.app , with the code here: https://github.com/sikkha/governance-visual

  • Note #1, DL definition:

Accountability in governance is the obligation of those in power to explain and justify their decisions and actions to the public and other stakeholders, ensuring that their conduct adheres to established legal, ethical, and procedural standards. Rooted in Enlightenment principles, it is fundamentally tied to the concept of consent of the governed, where leaders derive legitimacy from the will of the people and must operate within legal bounds. This involves transparent decision-making, performance monitoring, and the capacity to impose sanctions when necessary.

In democratic systems, regular, free, and fair elections serve as the primary mechanism for citizens to hold leaders accountable. However, accountability extends beyond elections to include ongoing oversight, checks and balances between government branches, and civil society scrutiny. These components collectively ensure that power is exercised responsibly, leaders remain answerable to the public, and governance remains responsive to the people’s will.

  • Note #2, trade-off in governance:

An administrative ruler has limited and indirect instruments to control elements of governance and limited capacity to implement ideas effectively. For example, according to Dani Rodrik, governments imposing an open economy face the “political trilemma of the world economy,” which posits that it is impossible to achieve all three of the following simultaneously: 1) Deep economic integration (globalization), 2) National sovereignty, and 3) Democratic governance. Countries must choose two out of the three, leading to significant trade-offs. Similarly, Ian Bremmer introduced his J-curve theory, which suggests that once a country imposes an open economy, it will initially struggle dramatically. However, upon crossing a certain threshold, the benefits will eventually offset the difficulties experienced in the early period.

  • Note #3, a delicate balance between decency vs corruption of power:

Fukuyama highlights the delicate balance between discretion and corruption. Professionals are entrusted with significant autonomy because it is assumed that their internalized norms and ethical standards will guide their actions, even in the absence of constant external monitoring. However, this discretion must be carefully managed to prevent it from leading to corrupt practices. See my interview about the complicated measurement of corruption, particularly via CPI, here.

  • Note #4, actually “Politics,” when considered as a separate entity from public administration (or as aiming to be distinct), represents the “national soul” or identity.

Above statement suggests that politics, distinct from public administration, embodies the deeper cultural, ideological, and emotional aspects of a nation — essentially, its “soul” or identity. In contrast to public administration, which focuses on the practical, technical, and managerial aspects of implementing policies and running governmental operations, politics is viewed here as the sphere where a nation’s core values, beliefs, and collective aspirations are expressed and contested. This distinction became more pronounced in the 1970s when public administration sought to define itself as a field separate from political science, emphasizing efficiency, effectiveness, and the technical aspects of governance over the ideological debates typically associated with politics.

In this context, the concept of nationhood without a formal state does indeed exist, as seen in the examples of the Kurds and Palestinians. Both groups exemplify how a nation can possess a distinct identity, shared history, language, culture, and sense of collective belonging, even in the absence of a recognized state.

From Durkheim’s perspective, nationhood reflects the collective consciousness of a group — the shared beliefs, values, and norms that unify people into a cohesive community. The Kurds and Palestinians, despite not having a sovereign state, demonstrate a strong sense of national identity rooted in their shared experiences, cultural heritage, and aspirations for self-determination. Their collective consciousness serves as a powerful force that binds them together as a nation, even without the formal structure of a state.

Weber’s distinction between the state and politics further supports this idea. While Weber defines the state as an entity that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory, he also recognizes that political communities can exist outside of this formal structure. The Kurds and Palestinians engage in political activities, maintain cultural institutions, and strive for political recognition, reflecting their nationhood despite lacking a fully sovereign state apparatus. Their political struggles and aspirations represent the essence of their national identity — their “national soul” — which persists even without the formal trappings of statehood.

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Kan Yuenyong

A geopolitical strategist who lives where a fine narrow line amongst a collision of civilizations exists.