Europe’s Defense Illusion: The Myth of Strategic Autonomy
John J. Mearsheimer’s Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War remains one of the most prescient analyses of post-Cold War geopolitics. Written in 1990, at a time when optimism about European integration and perpetual peace was at its peak, Mearsheimer warned that this so-called “new era” was nothing more than a temporary pause in Europe’s long history of power struggles. He argued that the Cold War’s bipolar order — where the United States and the Soviet Union balanced each other — created an artificial stability that would not last. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Europe would revert to multipolarity, a system that historically breeds insecurity, instability, and, eventually, war. His views were widely dismissed at the time as overly pessimistic. Today, however, his warnings are proving correct, as the continent faces a strategic crisis with the return of great power competition and the erosion of American security commitments.
One of Mearsheimer’s central arguments was that Europe’s security was never self-sustaining — it depended entirely on American military presence through NATO. With the U.S. acting as Europe’s security guarantor, the continent was able to pursue economic integration without investing seriously in military power. However, this was always an illusion. Today, that illusion has been shattered as the United States, under Donald Trump’s leadership, signals a clear shift away from its traditional role in European security. Trump’s latest move — to negotiate directly with Russia over Ukraine without involving either European allies or Ukraine itself — underscores the fragility of Europe’s geopolitical position. The fact that European leaders were caught off guard by this development reflects their long-standing strategic complacency.
Nowhere is this complacency more evident than in Germany and France, both of which have long championed the idea of European “strategic autonomy.” The problem is that strategic autonomy has remained an abstract political talking point rather than a concrete military reality. Germany, still bound by its post-World War II reluctance to militarize, has consistently underfunded its defense capabilities. France, while militarily stronger, has been unwilling to extend its nuclear deterrent to serve as a true European umbrella.
France left NATO’s military structure in 1966 under Charles de Gaulle to maintain strategic and nuclear independence, resisting U.S. dominance. However, it remained in the alliance politically and would likely have supported NATO in a Soviet war, but under its own command. France’s nuclear deterrent (Force de Frappe) was designed to act independently, ensuring its defense while still aligning with Western interests. This historical reluctance to fully integrate defense capabilities persists today — unlike London, which remains part of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) — contributing to Europe’s inability to establish a credible alternative to NATO.
Meanwhile, the European Union as a whole has failed to develop a coherent defense structure, preferring to focus on economic and diplomatic integration. Now that the United States is stepping back, these weaknesses are being exposed. There is no credible European alternative to NATO, and without the U.S. security guarantee, European states are left to navigate a far more uncertain security landscape.
Poland, in contrast, has never shared Western Europe’s illusions about peace through integration. It has long viewed NATO not as a political formality but as a vital military shield against Russian aggression. Since 2022, Poland has undertaken a dramatic military buildup, seeking to become the strongest land force in Europe. Unlike Germany and France, Poland has always understood that power is not built on economic cooperation alone — it is forged through military capability and strategic alliances. With Trump deprioritizing NATO and pursuing direct negotiations with Putin, Poland now faces a critical moment. It can either double down on its reliance on Washington, despite the clear signs that U.S. interests are shifting toward the Indo-Pacific, or it can pursue an independent security strategy, forming new regional coalitions with Finland, the Baltic states, and potentially a pro-Western Ukraine. Given the uncertainty surrounding Ukraine’s future, Poland may even play a role in integrating parts of Ukraine into a broader Eastern European defense framework.
Mearsheimer’s broader thesis — that multipolarity breeds instability — is becoming evident across the continent. Without a dominant security structure, European states will be forced to return to classical balance-of-power politics, forming shifting alliances based on national interest rather than ideological unity. The idea that the European Union could evolve into a superstate capable of replacing NATO has been exposed as a fantasy. The EU is fundamentally a political and economic entity, not a military one. The lack of a unified defense vision among its member states — exacerbated by divergent national interests — means that when security crises arise, the EU is not an effective actor. Rather than unifying under a single military command, European states will increasingly prioritize their own defense strategies, with some aligning more closely with the United States while others seek regional security arrangements.
Trump’s approach to Russia, often described as a reverse Kissinger move, is accelerating this shift. During the Cold War, Henry Kissinger engineered a strategic opening between the U.S. and China to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Trump, however, appears to be doing the opposite — seeking an understanding with Russia to focus U.S. strategic attention on China. This move has profound implications for European security. If Washington no longer prioritizes containing Russia, then the burden of deterring Moscow falls entirely on European states. Without American backing, states like Germany and France will be forced to either significantly increase defense spending or accept a diminished role in global security affairs. Meanwhile, Poland and other frontline states will have no choice but to build their own security networks, independent of Brussels’ bureaucratic paralysis.
In the long term, Europe has two choices: either it builds real military power and takes responsibility for its own security, or it accepts the reality of fragmentation, where individual states navigate security dilemmas on their own. The most likely scenario is that Europe does not unify but instead returns to a multipolar balance-of-power system, much like the 19th century. NATO may continue to exist in name, but its credibility will be significantly weakened. Meanwhile, initiatives like Weimar+ — touted as a bold step toward European defense leadership — are more aspirational than operational, lacking the very military backbone needed to make them credible. As Mearsheimer predicted, when security guarantees disappear, states fall back on their own capabilities rather than relying on collective institutions.
Europe may continue indulging in pleasant theories of strategic autonomy — summits will be held, white papers will be published, and declarations of unity will be made. But reality, as ever, has a way of making its own arrangements.
