A clash of idea in China’s foreign policy : Nationalist vs Globalist
The Nationalist
This is a gem from Prof Fang Ning, a director of Chinese Academic of Social Science (CASS). He gives an interesting view on Trump, his policy and driving forces behind his political power to reshape the world. Different from mainstream medias and thinkers, Prof Fang Ning views Trump as a smart politician who demonstrates his talent and ability not different from Obama or Bush. Although he is not the most successful business entrepreneur, but he has talent to exploit complicated network and connection, keen on an art of deception, have ability of artistic of truth and lie blending, know how to effectively be friend with allies and how to attack adversaries. He has a strong political will to Make America Great Again, and very different from Obama, Trump will inherit a strong congress support, which will allow him do many policy work, such as an appointment of Neil McGill Gorsuch.
The rising of Obama, according to Prof Fang Ning, was an anomaly of American politics. Therefore he couldn’t get any political achievement. But this was not only Obama, but this has been since George W Bush, thus, a creation of “period of strategic opportunity” (战略机遇期) for China for the past 16 years. This is why I think it’s difficult to justify the American decline as a problem of geopolitics or world-economy?
Obama was the first black president, and he’s not belong to the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP). He would get a resistance from his idea to surpass the African American struggle for equality. Prof Ning has precisely predicted that if not all, but most of Obama’s legacy such as a withdrawn from the Middle East, Guantanamo, Obamacare will be finally undone.
Trump works with his voting base — a “New-populism”, or people in Rust Belt and Bible belt. But he will gradually fabricate with “power elites” such as Business Republicans, Religious Republicans, Military-Industrial Complex Republicans, Libor Democrats, and California high tech Democrats.
Prof Ning has rightly and interestingly addressed three estates of “political structure” in America, which are (1) constitutional level such as politicians, officers, members of the parliament etc., (2) “power elites” and (3) the deepest level on different interested groups.
According to “Who’s Running America” by Thomas R. Dye and various studies by John Mearsheimer, the “power elites” is the real ruling class in the U.S. These people will keep low profile, and won’t possess official legal title. They will weaving their power behind the scene.
Prof Ning has categorized Trump’s policies in three layers: (1) Initial layer: he will control immigration and will slow non-WASP population in America. Building a wall to contain Hispanic workers can be considered as a policy under this layer, (2) the intermediate layer: he will, according to libertarian school, decrease welfare spending, and (3) The final layer: he will restore American industrial and commerce sectors. This layer will involve with various trade policy renegotiating, especially with NAFTA and countries like Germany, Japan, and China.
====
16年来，美国政府出于种种原因吧，并没有把中国真正当做对手。2001年小布什上台伊始就提出“对手论”，但不久就发生了9·11，美国转向了。8年后奥巴马上台，提出所谓“重返亚洲”、“亚洲再平衡”等战略，当时的希拉里国务卿还提出了“巧实力”。我认为这些都是主要针对中国的。但我们知道，奥巴马是美国历史上第一位具有非欧洲裔血统的总统，这就触及了美国政治最隐秘、最深层次的问题 — — 美国的那个“永远的痛”。奥巴马当政之后，遇到了前所未有的阻力，这种阻击很大程度上是针对他本人而非他的政策的。十分遗憾，奥巴马这8年简直可以说是一无所成。他自己也很是沮丧。过去16年的国际环境给中国创造了很大的机会，我们称之为“战略机遇期”。
随着特朗普的上台，情况会有很大的变化，这可要引起我们的警觉。现在大家很关心特朗普新政府的政策走向，但如何靠谱地分析这一问题，关键是要准确、深入认识特朗普上台的原因。如果我们不能真正了解特朗普如何胜选的，就并能不了解他的政治基础和社会背景，进而也就很难了解和理解他的行为和未来政策。换言之，正确认识特朗普胜选的原因是预测其行为和政策的基础。
Further notes:
(1) What can explain an extraordinary period of growth in China, or what Prof Ning has stated that a “phase of strategic opportunity” of China for the past 16 years, world-economy or geopolitics?
If it is the first, China’s economy will inevitably surpass the U.S. with in the next 2–3 decades, but if it’s the latter?
As I said, “there is a conversion of power among different realm”, and we mustn’t view this reality from economic lens only.
(2)
“An overview of the situation shows that for our country, the first two decades of the 21st century are a period of important strategic opportunities, which we must seize tightly and which offers bright prospects. In accordance with the development objectives up to 2010, the centenary of the Party and that of New China, as proposed at the Fifteenth National Congress, we need to concentrate on building a well-off society of a higher standard in an all-round way to the benefit of well over one billion people in this period. We will further develop the economy, improve democracy, advance science and education, enrich culture, foster social harmony and upgrade the texture of life for the people. The two decades of development will serve as an inevitable connecting link for attainting the third-step strategic objectives for our modernization drive as well as a key stage for improving the socialist market economy and opening wider to the outside world. Building on what is achieved at this stage and continuing to work for several more decades, we will have in the main accomplished the modernization program and turned China into a strong, prosperous, democratic and culturally advanced socialist country by the middle of this century.”
(3)
“In this three-part brief, produced by a team of analysts with diverse backgrounds who have jointly translated the plan in full, we present three perspectives on the new document and China’s AI development trajectory. In part one, Rogier Creemers of the Leiden Asia Centre puts the plan in the context of China’s own framework for regulatory problem-solving. In part two, Paul Triolo of the Eurasia Group and Graham Webster of Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center describe the prospects for leadership in AI and China’s policy world linked with the plan. And in part three, Elsa Kania addresses China’s pursuit of indigenous innovation to enable its advances in next-generation AI.”
The Globalist
Yet the debate in Beijing is partially stymied by feelings that U.S. animosity toward China remains unchanged, so China should do little to help the United States solve the North Korea issue. Of course, this faction opposes China’s unilateral action to pressure North Korea. Such opposition no doubt adds to the Chinese government’s hesitation to utilize a number of economic tools at its disposal, such as ending oil deliveries to the North. But if the two powers could maintain a forward-looking approach to regional security, they could work together to ensure that North Korea truly feels the pain of international sanctions. Beijing’s suspension of coal imports from the North, for example, was a big blow to Kim Jong-Un’s regime, as Pyongyang has used most of its income from coal imports to develop its nuclear weapons.
In this regard, Trump needs to understand the complexity of China’s thinking on North Korean policy. Getting China to take more responsibility on North Korea requires both a gentle and a hard push. The Trump administration has made it clear that it will not tolerate a nuclear North Korea — but Beijing has heard this before. Despite the rhetorical flourish, to the experienced Chinese diplomat, the Trump administration’s policy sounds quite a lot like those of Presidents George W. Bush and Obama: a desire to achieve denuclearization but an unwillingness for this to come at the cost of war on the peninsula. Chinese President Xi Jinping is similarly bound by the strategic logic of China’s long-standing approach to its petulant neighbor — avoiding the dangers and uncertainty of war and instability by looking past the present consequences of North Korea’s actions. Xi’s view of North Korea is still dominated by the fear of a reunified Korea under Seoul, which may want U.S. forces to remain in the country. This is a legitimate concern, but it is possible, given Trump’s isolationist stance, that he might consider not stationing U.S. troops above the 38th parallel or deploying offensive capabilities to a unified Korea. — Zhu Feng
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-07-11/chinas-north-korean-liability
